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█ Abstract In this article I take a nativist-modularist perspective on mindreading, endorsing the hypothe-
sis that a form of primary mindreading is not a developmental achievement, but an innate social-cognitive 
evolutionary adaptation implemented by neurocomputational mechanisms that come online during the 
first year of age. Moreover, I recommend a cognitive-constructivist stance on introspection. Expanding 
on Peter Carruthers’ strong case for the claim that mindreading has a functional and evolutionary priority 
over introspection, I maintain that mindreading is also developmentally prior to introspection. If the lat-
ter is not taken as a competence in isolation, but placed in its context of meaning, i.e., the construction and 
defense of subjective identity, good reasons emerge for arguing that it takes shape through the act of turning 
on oneself the capacity to mindread other people; and that this occurs through that socio-communicative 
interaction with caregivers (and successively other social partners) investigated by the attachment theory. 
KEYWORDS: Attachment; Subjective identity; Introspection; Mindreading. 
 
█ Riassunto Comprensione della mente altrui e introspezione – In questo articolo assumo una prospettiva 
innatistico-modularistica in relazione alla capacità di comprendere le menti altrui (mindreading), acco-
gliendo l’ipotesi che una forma primaria di mindreading sia non già una conquista ontogenetica bensì un 
adattamento socio-cognitivo realizzato da meccanismi neurocomputazionali specifici per dominio, già 
operativi intorno ai 12 mesi di età. Adotterò invece una prospettiva cognitiva e costruttivista sul-
l’introspezione. Estendendo il ragionamento di Peter Carruthers in favore della tesi secondo cui il mind-
reading ha una priorità funzionale e filogenetica sull’introspezione, sosterrò che la prima capacità ha una 
priorità anche ontogenetica sulla seconda. Se la mentalizzazione in prima persona è presa nel suo contesto 
di senso, ovvero la costruzione e difesa dell’identità soggettiva, si può sostenere che essa si costituisce 
nell’atto di rivolgere su se stessi la capacità di mentalizzare in terza persona, e che questo si verifica in vir-
tù di quella interazione socio-comunicativa con il caregiver (e successivamente con gli altri partner sociali) 
che è oggetto di indagine della psicodinamica dell’attaccamento. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Attaccamento; Identità soggettiva; Introspezione; Mindreading. 
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█ Introspection I: The self/other parity ac-
count 
 
DURING THE 1980S AND 1990S most of 
the work in Theory of Mind was concerned 
with the mechanisms that subserve third-
person mentalization (henceforth “min-
dreading”); but in the last decade an increas-
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ing number of psychologists and philoso-
phers have also proposed accounts of the 
mechanisms underlying first-person mentali-
zation (henceforth “introspection”). This re-
quired a synergy with other research tradi-
tions, most notably the studies on confabula-
tion in cognitive neuropsychology and social 
psychology.2 
These research traditions deliver us a 
huge amount of experiments showing a mis-
match between the explanatory motives that 
the subjects report to account for their be-
havior and the motivations (i.e., the multiple 
real causes) of their behavior. In other words, 
in these experiments the participants do not 
have any direct access to the real causes of 
their behavior; rather, they engage in a ra-
tionalization or confabulation, i.e., they make 
use of socially shared explanatory theories or 
of an idiosyncratic theorizing, to fabricate 
reasonable but imaginary explanations of the 
motivational factors of their behavior. 
In this theoretical and experimental frame-
work, the subjects no longer enjoy a privileged 
access to their own inner life. Rather, they are 
engaged in an interpretative activity that de-
pends on mechanisms capitalizing on explana-
tory theories that apply to the same extent to 
themselves and other people. Such mechanisms 
are triggered by information about mind-
external states of affairs, i.e., the subject’s be-
havior and the situation in which it occurs – 
information, therefore, in respect to which the 
subject enjoys no particular epistemic authori-
ty. This is a theory of self-knowledge that as-
sumes a “self/other parity”.3 
In social psychology Bem’s self-perception 
theory pioneered a self/other parity account 
of self-knowledge. With reference to Skin-
ner’s methodological guidance, but with a 
position that reveals affinities with symbolic 
interactionism, he holds that individuals  
 
come to “know” their own attitudes, emo-
tions, and other internal states partially by 
inferring them from observations of their 
own overt behavior and/or the circum-
stances in which this behavior occurs.4  
Nisbett and Wilson developed Bem’s ap-
proach, claiming that behavioral and contex-
tual data are the input of mechanisms that 
exploit theories that apply to the same extent 
to ourselves and to others.5 In this formula-
tion, the self/other parity account of self-
knowledge was welcomed by the theory-
theorists in developmental psychology.6 
It is to be noticed, however, that the 
self/other parity account is never suggested 
as an exhaustive theory of self-knowledge; 
some margin is always left for some sort of 
direct self-knowledge.7 Nisbett and Wilson, 
for instance, draw a sharp distinction be-
tween process and content, i.e., between the 
causal processes underlying judgments, deci-
sions, emotions, sensations and those judg-
ments, decisions, emotions, sensations them-
selves. Subjects have direct access to this 
mental content, and this allows them to 
know it «with near certainty».8 By contrast, 
they have no access to the cognitive process-
es that cause behavior. However, insofar as 
the two psychologists do not offer any hy-
pothesis about this alleged direct self-
knowledge, their theory is incomplete.9 
 
█ Introspection II: The inner sense account 
 
In order to offer an account of this sup-
posedly direct self-knowledge, some philoso-
phers tried to develop some up-to-date ver-
sion of the Lockean “inner sense” theory, 
construing introspection as a process that 
permits the access to at least some mental 
phenomena in a relatively direct and non-
interpretative way. On this perspective, in-
trospective access does not appeal to theories 
that serve to interpret behavioral and con-
textual data, but rather exploits mechanisms 
that can receive information about inner life 
through a relatively direct channel.10  
The attempt to bestow psychological 
plausibility on the inner sense theory of in-
trospection comes in various forms. Intro-
spection may be realized by a mechanism 
that processes information about the func-
tional profile of mental states, or their repre-
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sentational content, or both kinds of infor-
mation.11 A representationalist-functionalist 
version of the inner sense theory is Nichols 
and Stich’s account of introspection in terms 
of monitoring mechanisms.12 Their hypothe-
sis is that whereas detecting others’ mental 
states and reasoning about one’s own and 
others’ mental states are all subserved by the 
same “Theory of Mind Information”, the 
mechanism for detecting one’s own mental 
states is quite independent of the mechanism 
that deals with the mental states of other 
people. More precisely, Nichols and Stich’s 
hypothesis assumes the existence of a set of 
distinct self-monitoring computational me-
chanisms, including one for monitoring and 
providing self-knowledge of one’s own per-
ceptual states, and one for monitoring and 
providing self-knowledge of one’s own pro-
positional attitudes. 
The monitoring mechanisms account is 
concerned only with mentalistic self-attri-
bution. As for third-person mentalization and 
third- and first-person mentalizing reasoning, 
Nichols and Stich make appeal to the theory-
theory. This allows them to restrict the scope 
of the experiments that show confabulation 
effects. The errors made by the participants 
are not about mental-state self-attribution but 
rather first-person mentalistic reasoning; i.e., 
understanding the causes of one’s own beha-
vior involves reasoning about mental states, 
and this is definitely a theory-laden process. 
Thus, if folk-psychological theory is lacking 
the resources to account for a behavioral se-
quence, the participant will make inferential 
errors regarding both one’s own inner life and 
others’. In other terms, self-knowledge can 
count on two methods: in some circumstances 
the individuals interpret by exploiting a folk-
psychological theory, which may give rise to 
confabulatory talks; but in other circumstances 
they can directly and non-interpretatively ac-
cess one’s own mind.13 
Nichols and Stich see introspection as an 
inner sense faculty, i.e., a faculty that pro-
vides us with a direct quasi-perceptual chan-
nel of informational access to our own men-
tal life. This is also Goldman’s project, who 
however tries to relaunch the idea of inner 
sense within the framework of mental simu-
lation.14 Here introspection both ontogene-
tically precedes and grounds mindreading. 
Mindreaders need to introspectively access 
their offline products of mental simulation 
before they can project them onto the target; 
and this is a form of direct access. Building on 
Craig’s account of interoception, as well as 
Marr’s and Biederman’s computational models 
of visual object recognition, Goldman main-
tains that introspection is a perception-like 
process that involves a transduction mecha-
nism that takes neural properties of mental 
states as input and outputs representations in a 
proprietary code, which code represents types 
of mental categories and classifies mental-state 
tokens in terms of such categories.15 
To recapitulate. In this section we have 
discussed the approach of some philosophers 
who acknowledge the theoretical, and hence 
non-introspective, character of first-person 
knowledge of the causes of our thoughts and 
behavior, and nevertheless continue to think 
that in some specific cases the access to one’s 
mental life is direct and non-interpretative. 
Nichols and Stich’s theory of introspection 
postulates mechanisms that are fed, through 
a relatively direct channel, by information 
about perceptual and propositional attitude 
states. Goldman argues that the mindreader 
needs to introspectively access its offline pro-
ducts of mental simulation before it can pro-
ject them onto the target; and introspection 
is a perception-like process. As we will see in 
the next section, however, both theories are 
vulnerable to Carruthers’ criticism of the 
idea of a non-interpretative access to propo-
sitional attitudes. 
 
█ Introspection III: Self-interpretation plus 
sensory access 
 
In opposition to the attempt to develop a 
cognitively plausible inner sense view of in-
trospection (both in Nichols and Stich’s ver-
sion as well as in Goldman’s), Carruthers de-
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veloped a very sophisticated version of the 
self/other parity account: the interpretive 
sensory-access (ISA) account of the nature 
and sources of self-knowledge.16 According 
to the ISA account, although we can have 
non-interpretive access to our own sensory 
and affective states, the self-attribution of 
propositional attitude states is always, in 
agreement with the self/other parity account, 
a swift and unconscious process of self-
interpretation that exploits the same sensory 
channels that we utilize when working out 
other people’s mental states.  
In order to account for the conscious ac-
cessibility of our perceptual states, the ISA ac-
count assumes the validity of the global work-
space models of human neurocognitive archi-
tecture. There is now extensive evidence sup-
porting such models;17 moreover, analyses of 
functional connectivity patterns in the human 
brain have demonstrated just the sort of neu-
ral architecture necessary to realize the main 
elements of a global broadcasting account.18  
More specifically, these studies show the 
existence of two main neurocomputational 
spaces within the brain, each characterized 
by a distinct pattern of connectivity.19 The 
first space is a processing network, composed 
of a set of parallel, distributed, and function-
ally specialized processors or modular subsys-
tems characterized by highly specific local or 
medium-range connections. The subsystems 
compete each other to access the global neu-
ronal workspace, which is implemented by 
long-range cortico-cortical connections, most-
ly originating from the pyramidal cells of lay-
ers 2 and 3 that are particularly dense in pre-
frontal, parieto-temporal and cingulate asso-
ciative cortices, together with their thalamo-
cortical loops. When one of these subsystems 
accesses the global neuronal workspace, its 
outputs (i.e., sensory information including 
perceptions of the world, the deliverances of 
somatosensory systems, imagery and inner-
speech) are broadcast to an array of concept-
using consumer systems – e.g., systems that 
use the perceptual input to form judgments 
or make decisions.20  
Among the conceptual judgment-forming 
systems there is a mindreading system which, 
drawing on a folk-psychological theoretical 
framework, generates metarepresentational 
beliefs about the mental states of others and 
of oneself. This system has access to all sen-
sory information broadcast by our perceptual 
systems; and hence it can have a non-inter-
pretive (“recognitional”) access to one’s own 
sensory and affective states. But what about 
the outputs of the other consumer systems, 
i.e., propositional-attitude events?  
Most philosophers assume that proposi-
tional attitudes are consciously accessible, 
relying on 
 
a conception of the mind as containing, at 
its core, a workspace in which thoughts 
can be created, reflected on, and evaluat-
ed, and in which attitudes of all types can 
be active and enter into processes of rea-
soning and thinking.21  
 
However, Carruthers replies, the only 
central workspace in the human mind is the 
working memory system, which utilizes the 
mechanisms of global broadcast to subserve a 
wide variety of central-cognitive purposes. 
And what can be found within working 
memory are not propositional attitudes, but 
rather imagery, inner speech, and so forth; 
working memory’s operations are always sen-
sory based. Indeed, there are good reasons for 
thinking that propositional attitudes are not 
capable of being globally broadcast, and 
hence can never be consciously accessible.22  
Since there are also good reasons for 
thinking that there are no causal pathways 
from the outputs of the consumer systems to 
mindreading system,23 the latter must exploit 
the globally broadcast perceptual infor-
mation, together with some forms of stored 
knowledge, to infer the agent’s propositional 
attitudes, precisely as it happens with third-
person mindreading. Thus, as already men-
tioned, self-attribution of propositional atti-
tudes always occurs by means of a process of 
self-interpretation, which rests on the sensory 
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awareness of data concerning one’s own be-
havior, contextual data and/or sensory items 
in working memory. 
In addition to experimental findings about 
the nature and sensory basis of broadcasting 
and working memory, Carruthers defends his 
ISA account taking position on (i) the nature 
and source of our capacities for metacogni-
tive control of learning and reasoning; (ii) 
alleged dissociations between self-knowledge 
and other-knowledge in autism and schizo-
phrenia; and (iii) the above-mentioned stud-
ies on confabulation in cognitive neuropsy-
chology and social psychology. Let us quickly 
consider (i)-(iii). 
 
█  Considerations concerning the evolution-
ary role of mindreading and the literature 
on metacognition  
 
The ISA account posits a single phyloge-
netic route for both mindreading and intro-
spection – an integrated faculty of meta-
representation evolved for mindreading and 
later exapted for introspection. This is what 
is legitimate to expect in light of the hypothe-
sis that mindreading, as an ingredient essen-
tial to our social intelligence, evolved to pro-
vide an adaptive advantage in pursuing the 
aims of two motivational macrosystems, the 
first committed to self-assertiveness and 
competition; the second aimed to pro-
sociality and cooperation.24 
It has been objected that meta-repre-
sentational mindreading is likely to be a late 
«exaptation derived from linguistic abilities 
and general-purpose concept learning resour-
ces».25 To this Carruthers replied that there 
are at least two problems with this view.  
First, a series of investigations using non-
verbal, spontaneous-response versions of 
false-belief tasks provides evidence that me-
tarepresentational mindreading is already pre-
sent in infants around the middle of the first 
year of life, implemented by the domain-
specific component of the mindreading sys-
tem.26 Second, metarepresentation is required 
for lexical acquisition; if children were not 
able to grasp the speaker’s referential inten-
tions, learning the meanings of words would 
not be possible.27 
In contrast with the ISA account, inner 
sense theories bear an explanatory burden. 
For if introspection and mindreading are im-
plemented by two (or more) neurocognitive 
mechanisms, then a distinct account of the 
evolution of each is needed. One hypothesis 
about the kind of evolutionary pressure that 
can account for the emergence of first-person 
mentalizing mechanism(s) is that the capaci-
ty to represent one’s own mental states (or 
some subset thereof) evolved first, presuma-
bly to enable organisms to increase the ad-
vantages of metacognitive monitoring and 
control.28 Once evolved, the conceptual and 
inferential resources involved were somehow 
exapted for mindreading.29 
However, the hypothesis that introspec-
tion evolved for metacognitive purposes does 
not tally with the available evidence. The 
human and comparative metacognitive data 
seem to show at least two things. First, in 
many cases the controlling function of meta-
cognition does not involve any introspective 
capacity.30 Second, our metacognitive inter-
ventions are not capable of the sort of direct 
impact on cognitive processing that would be 
predicted if metacognition had, indeed, 
evolved for the purpose.31 
Dissociation data. Since Nichols and Stich’s 
monitoring mechanisms account assumes that 
introspection does not involve mechanisms of 
the sort that figure in mindreading, it implies 
that the first capacity should be dissociable 
from the second. Accordingly, they make the 
hypothesis of a double dissociation between 
schizophrenia and autism. In adults with As-
perger’s syndrome the capacity of detecting 
their own mental states would be intact de-
spite of the mindreading deficit; the opposite 
pattern would be observed in schizophrenic 
patients with passivity experiences.32  
The ISA account predicts that this dissoci-
ation should not occur, since there is just a 
single faculty involved in both mindreading 
and introspection. Consequently, Carruthers 
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recruits data that refute Nichols and Stich’s 
hypothesis. For example, Williams and Happé 
showed that in children with autism spectrum 
disorder the capacity to attribute intentions to 
themselves is just as impaired as is the capaci-
ty to attribute intentions to others, and that 
both poor performances can be imputed to 
the difficulties that ASD children have with 
mindreading in general.33 With regard to 
schizophrenia, Carruthers points out that pas-
sivity experiences are not best explained by 
the impairment of a system subserving first-
person mindreading. A more fruitful hypothe-
sis is the failure of the “comparator system”.34 
Confabulation data. Even more than phy-
logenetic and psychopathological considera-
tions, the central prediction made by the ISA 
account is frequent confabulation, which 
serves to distinguish it empirically from the 
inner-sense theories of self-knowledge.35 As 
seen above, the inner-sense theorists accom-
modate the confabulation data by postulat-
ing two methods – there would be an intro-
spective but also an interpretive route to our 
own attitudes. Consequently, inner-sense 
theories are less simple than the ISA account. 
Still more important, unlike inner-sense the-
orists’ dual-method hypothesis, the ISA ac-
count can explain the overall patterning of 
the confabulation data. Since Carruthers’ 
model holds that the knowledge of one’s 
propositional attitudes rests on a theory-
driven interpretive process that is fed by sen-
sory and behavioral data, it predicts confabu-
lation effects anytime such data are mislead-
ing, or the theories that the subjects use to 
interpret themselves are inadequate. The du-
al-method theorists, instead, will be in trou-
ble to provide some principled account of the 
circumstances in which people access their 
propositional attitudes directly and the cir-
cumstances in which they rely on self-
directed mindreading. 
 
█ The developmental asymmetry between 
introspection and mindreading 
 
Carruthers’ ISA account holds that min-
dreading has a functional and evolutionary 
priority over introspection, but it does not 
predict that the former is developmentally 
prior to the latter.36  
However, Carruthers also advances the 
hypothesis that the mindreading system must 
contain a model of what minds are and of 
«the access that agents have to their own 
mental states».37 Such a model is likely to be 
essentially “Cartesian”, assuming that sub-
jects know, immediately and without self-in-
terpretation, what they are experiencing, 
judging and intending. This assumption, 
Carruthers speculates, may have great heuris-
tic value, greatly simplifying the mindreading 
system’s computations. But then he also no-
tices that an alternative account to his is out-
lined by T.D. Wilson, who suggests that the 
self-transparency assumption  
 
may make it easier for subjects to engage 
in various kinds of adaptive self-dece-
ption, helping them build and maintain a 
positive self-image. In fact, both accounts 
might be true.38  
 
Moreover, Carruthers contemplates Wil-
son’s hypothesis again, holding that the claim 
that the emergence of introspection is a by-
product of the evolution of mindreading is 
compatible with the hypothesis that the former  
 
might have come under secondary selection 
thereafter, perhaps by virtue of helping to 
build and maintain a positive self-image.39 
 
Thus, here Carruthers is opening the door 
to the psychodynamic topic of defense me-
chanisms, i.e., the hypothesis that our activity 
of re-appropriation of the products of the 
neurocomputational unconscious is ruled by 
a self-apologetic defensiveness.  
On the other hand, the above-mentioned 
studies in social psychology which investigat-
ed how human behavior can respond to mo-
tivational factors that are not available to in-
trospection and verbal report, as well as the 
extended literature on causal attributions, 
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have their main origin in Freud and psycho-
analysis. There is a problem, though. Car-
ruthers’ focus is not on self-knowledge con-
strued as «awareness of oneself as an ongoing 
bearer of mental states and dispositions, who 
has both a past and a future».40 His focus – he 
makes clear – is knowledge of one’s own current 
mental states; and this knowledge «is arguably 
more fundamental than knowledge of oneself 
as a self with an ongoing mental life».41 
Now, insofar as Carruthers takes intro-
spection merely as a competence to self-attri-
bute one’s own current mental states, Wil-
son’s hypothesis of the self-defensive nature 
of introspection cannot be built into the ISA 
theory. As it will be made clear below, the 
psychodynamic topic of defenses makes sense 
only in the context of the construction and 
protection of the psychological (as opposed 
to bodily) self-consciousness, or subjective 
identity. However, once introspection is placed 
into this context, it becomes possible to argue 
that it develops through the act of turning on 
oneself the competence to mind-read others; 
and that this occurs through that socio-
communicative interaction with caregivers 
which is the subject matter of the psychody-
namics of attachment.  
These different ways of viewing introspec-
tion seem to be what is at stake in an exchange 
between Fernyhough and Carruthers on BBS’s 
pages.42 Fernyhough draws the attention to 
some sources of evidence for the hypothesis of 
a late emergence of the child’s inner experience 
– in particular, the findings that the transfor-
mation of private speech into inner speech may 
not be complete until middle childhood, and 
that visual imagery also takes time to develop.43  
Since inner speech and visual imagery are 
among the data that feed the interpretive pro-
cess underlying the knowledge of one’s propo-
sitional attitude states, Fernyhough concludes 
that the emergence of introspection should be 
developmentally constrained by the emergence 
of inner speech and visual imagery.  
Given what we know about the timetable 
for the emergence of mindreading abilities 
(especially the already mentioned evidence 
for very early mindreading competences), 
Carruthers’ theory should predict a develop-
mental lag between mindreading and intro-
spection. However, Carruthers denied that 
there is such implication.44 
The problem here seems to be that Car-
ruthers and Fernyhough are approaching in-
trospection from very different perspectives. 
As said, the former’s focus is on a minimal 
sense of introspection as competence to self-
attribute one’s own current mental states 
taken independently from any cognition of 
oneself as a self construed as introspective 
self-description, i.e., the psychological self-
consciousness or subjective identity.  
By contrast, Fernyhough’s focus is pre-
cisely on the development of introspective 
self-consciousness in a Vygotskian perspec-
tive – an outward-in construction that occurs 
in an interpersonal context, namely in the re-
lationship with caregivers and peers. Thus, 
Carruthers takes introspection as a compe-
tence in isolation, and this notion is «too re-
strictive» to elaborate our understanding of 
its development beyond «the standard strat-
egy of comparing children’s performance 
across false-belief tasks».45 
Fernyhough, in contrast, sets introspection 
back in its context of meaning, one in which 
the turning of one’s mindreading abilities upon 
oneself is seen as part of the construction of an 
inner experiential space, and then of an autobi-
ographical self. It is introspection taken in this 
constructive dimension that is relevant to the 
psychodynamic topic of defenses. In order to 
make this point clear we have to turn our atten-
tion to the relation between mindreading and 
attachment theory. 
 
█ Attachment, mentalization, and psycho-
pathology 
 
According to the psychodynamics of at-
tachment, the primordial psychological need 
of the very young child, around which his 
mental life gradually takes shape, pertains to 
the physical contact and the construction of 
protective and communicative interpersonal 
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structures. In this perspective, several at-
tachment theorists and developmental psy-
chologists have put forward different ver-
sions of the hypothesis that there is a direct 
ontogenetic causal and functional link be-
tween security of infant attachment and its 
early interactive predictors on the one hand, 
and the development of explicit mindreading 
abilities in later childhood on the other.  
However, evidence does not confirm the 
hypothesis that the security of the attachment 
relationship is directly related to children’s 
mentalization development. According to 
Meins, the observed link between attachment 
security and mentalization is indirect, with 
both attachment security and mentalization 
performance being predicted by caregivers’ 
mind-mindedness, i.e., the proclivity to treat 
one’s infant as an individual with a mind, ra-
ther than merely an entity with needs that 
must be satisfied. In particular, an aspect of 
the caregivers’ internal-state language, namely 
comments that appear to be appropriate to 
the mental state of the child, is a predictor of 
children’s understanding of mind.46  
Now, there is no doubt that caregiver-
child communicative interaction impacts on 
the development of mentalization; the prob-
lem is how the child’s exposure to such inter-
action can have such an impact. In particular, 
the role that language plays in this context 
needs to be clarified. Jill De Villiers, for ex-
ample, would disagree with Meins’ hypothe-
sis that language, in the form of comments 
that appear to be appropriate to the mental 
state of the child, is crucial as element that is 
able to impact on the development of men-
talization. More radically, De Villiers thinks 
that our mentalistic abilities are constituted 
by language; more specifically, mastery of the 
grammatical rules for embedding tensed 
complement clauses under verbs of speech or 
cognition provides children with a necessary 
representational format for dealing with false 
beliefs.47  
It has been shown, however, that correla-
tion between linguistic exposure and min-
dreading does not depend on the use of spe-
cific grammatical structures; syntax is not 
constitutive of the mentalizing abilities of 
adults; and mastery of sentence complements 
is not even a necessary condition of the de-
velopment of mindreading in children.48 But 
above all, any theorizing on the relation be-
tween language and mentalization must 
come to grips with the already-cited investi-
gations that, using “spontaneous-response” 
tasks, seem to show that metarepresentation-
al abilities emerge from a specialized neu-
rocognitive mechanism that matures during 
the second year of life. Such evidence knocks 
out a constitution-thesis à la De Villiers, but 
also raises a problem for Meins’ hypothesis, 
which should be more prudently construed in 
terms of a form of scaffolding that initially is 
not linguistic.49 
Thus, there seems to be no direct ontoge-
netic causal and functional link between the 
quality of early infant attachment – or the lin-
guistic scaffolding consisting in mothers’ in-
ternal-state talk that is appropriately attuned 
to the infant’s thoughts and feelings – on the 
one hand, and the development of mindread-
ing on the other. The theory of attachment 
builds within a contextualist and systemic 
framework, where (individual) biology and 
(social) relationality cannot be separated. In-
dividuals are pre-wired to the interpersonal 
relationship from the birth, and mindreading 
is part and parcel of such pre-organization. 
Therefore, our competence to mindread oth-
ers is not a developmental achievement, but  
 
an innate social-cognitive evolutionary ad-
aptation implemented by a specialized and 
pre-wired mindreading mechanism that 
seems active and functional at least as early 
as 12 months of age in humans.50  
 
An adaptation, therefore, independent of 
the attachment system. When we take into 
consideration introspection, in contrast, the 
relationship between attachment and men-
talization is no longer simply a “scaffolding” 
one: the child’s socio-communicative interac-
tion with caregivers is constitutively involved 
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in the construction of the virtual inner space 
of the mind, or introspective self-conscious-
ness. The approach to first-person mentaliza-
tion is then less “neurocognitively guaran-
teed” and more markedly constructivist com-
pared with the mindreading abilities.  
In this perspective, introspective self-con-
sciousness takes shape in the child in a relation-
ship with caregivers that is made of words, de-
scriptions, designations, evaluations of the per-
son. Through the dialogue with caregivers (and 
then with other social partners) children con-
struct their own identity, both objective (for 
others) and subjective (for itself). And in the 
perspective of symbolic interactionism, the 
identity-for-itself can be said to arise out of the 
identity-for-others; introspective self-descrip-
tion takes shape through a process of internali-
zation of the ways in which others see and de-
fine us. As Gergely puts it,  
 
the intentional actions and attitudes re-
peatedly expressed towards the young 
child by caregivers and peers serve as the 
inferential basis for attributing general-
ized intentional properties to the self in 
an attempt to rationalize the social part-
ners’ self-directed behavior.51 
 
The development of introspection is, then, 
the process through which a subject constructs 
itself as psychologically self-conscious (and 
not only as physically self-conscious) in an in-
terplay of mindreading, autobiographical me-
mory, and socio-communicative capacities 
modulated by socio-cultural variables.  
The young child who turned his mindread-
ing abilities upon himself under the thrust of 
caregivers’ mind-minded talk, by the end of the 
preschool years begins to grasp his introspec-
tive self-description as rationalized in terms of 
autobiography.52 This is self-knowledge in its 
most demanding form, requiring  
 
a conception of oneself as a self, together 
with a capacity for narrative, weaving 
one’s current thoughts and experiences 
into a larger story of one’s life.53 
We are now in condition to see the con-
nection between introspective self-description 
and the psychodynamic topic of defenses. 
Breaking with a long philosophical tradition 
that has viewed self-consciousness as a purely 
cognitive phenomenon,54 the psychodynamics 
of attachment teaches us that affective growth 
and construction of identity cannot be sepa-
rated. The description of the self that from 2-3 
years of age the child feverishly pursues is an 
“accepting description”, i.e., a description that 
is indissolubly cognitive (as definition of self) 
and emotional-affectional (as acceptance of 
self). Briefly, the child needs a clear and con-
sistent capacity to describe itself, fully legiti-
mized by the caregiver and socially valid.  
On the other hand, this will continue to be 
the case during the entire cycle of life: one 
cannot ascribe concreteness and solidity to 
one’s own self-consciousness if the latter does 
not possess as a center a description of identi-
ty that must be clear and, indissolubly, “good” 
as worthy of being loved. Our mental balance 
rests on this feeling of solidly existing as an 
“I”; if the self-description becomes uncertain, 
the subject soon feels that the feeling of pres-
ence fades.55 It is here, therefore, with regard 
to the construction and defense of a well-
defined and interpersonally valid identity, that 
the idea of a direct ontogenetic causal and 
functional link between attachment and (first-
person) mentalization finds its application. 
 
█ Conclusions 
 
In this article I have taken a nativist-
modularist perspective on mindreading, en-
dorsing the hypothesis that a form of prima-
ry mindreading is not a developmental achie-
vement, but an innate social-cognitive evolu-
tionary adaptation implemented by neuro-
computational mechanisms that are active 
and functional by the first year of age. 
Moreover, I adopted a cognitive-con-
structivist stance on introspection. Expanding 
on Carruthers’ strong case for the claim that 
mindreading has a functional and evolution-
ary priority over introspection, I maintained 
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that mindreading is also developmentally pri-
or to introspection. If the latter is not taken as 
a competence in isolation, but placed in the 
context of the construction and defense of 
subjective identity, good reasons emerge for 
arguing that it develops through the act of 
turning on oneself the capacity to mindread 
other people; and that this occurs through 
that socio-communicative interaction with 
caregivers (and successively other social part-
ners) investigated by the attachment theory. 
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